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The company involvement with the politicians has received widespread criticism 
from academic researchers (Faccio, 2006; Faccio, 2010; Chaney et al., 2011; Braam et al., 
2015; Chi et al., 2016; Nowland, 2016; Hashmi et al., 2018; and Wulandari, 2018).The 
important research question is whether political connections are beneficial to the company. 
THE POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND EARNINGS 
QUALITY IN INDONESIA: A SURVEY LITERATURE 
      
  	
Providing information about quality earnings 
is the obligation of every company. Many 
factors are thought to affect the quality of 
earnings information issued by the company. 
One of these factors is political connections. 
Many studies explore political connections 
from different perspectives. Some research 
indicates political connections will benefit 
individuals who carry out roles in politics 
and companies. Some more research has 
found that political connections will benefit 
the company. Apart from all that, of course 
the quality of profits disclosed by the 
company becomes questionable. This 
research contributes to providing a detailed 
review of different studies on the relationship 
of political connections and earnings quality, 
and tries to describe in more detail the 
matters relating to both. In the future, this 













Political Connections, Earnings 
Quality, Survey literature 
Darmayanti, Kassim, Suryadimal 
2 
	
The Political Connections And Earnings Quality In Indonesia: A Survey Literature	
Public policies and political decisions made by bureaucrats and politicians, are decisions 
that will impact on the reputation, status, and survival of the company (Hillman, 2005). In 
theory, if a company has political connections and/or there are executives involved in 
politics, it will certainly benefit from their connections, such as participating in the decision 
making process, easy understanding of public policy processes, gaining access to parties 
related to the issuance of decisions the ultimate goal is to maintain the reputation and status 
of them and the company. 
This connection is very common in less developed countries; have higher levels of 
corruption, poor financial reporting performance and quality, low law enforcement, and 
impose restrictions on foreign investment (Faccio, 2006; Faccio, 2010; Fan et al., 2007; 
Channey et al., 2011; Chen et al., 2010; Boubakri et al., 2012). The tendency found in 
developing countries is the ease for companies that are politically connected privileges in 
the activities of their companies, such as ease of access to banking (Desai and Olofsgrad, 
2011; Claessens et al., 2008; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), escape from tax liabilities (Faccio, 
2006), and other obligations, such as utility bills which are quite large (Desai and 
Olofsgrad, 2011). 
There are several reasons that strengthen the suspicion why politically connected 
companies have poor reporting quality. First, politically connected companies need a large 
source of expenditure for company operations. Keeping investors from attracting their 
investments, and/or creditors providing loans as needed is the company's target, so that 
earnings management activities are carried out to achieve these goals (Leuz et al., 2003). 
Second, protection obtained from political connections results in companies not focusing 
on the quality of information to the public, but rather focusing on maintaining those 
connections (Chaney et al., 2011). Third, ease of access to prefential financing and low 
taxes due to political connections has resulted in companies not focusing on the public 
interest (Chaney et al., 2011; Faccio, 2010; Leuz et al., 2003). 
From the PwC (2014) survey, more than 95% of public companies in Indonesia are 
family companies, so the majority of their voting rights are founders or people who acquire 
companies, for example couples, parents, children, or heirs. At least one family 
representative is involved in company management, as the highest leader. if the highest 
leadership has voting rights in the company and also has a political position or has a 
political connection, of course the strategic decisions that will be made in the company are 
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also influenced by its interests in the political world. Like the findings from Fisman (2001) 
who found that politically connected firms in Indonesia strongly rely on the benefits from 
their connections. Also, Harymawan and Nowland (2016) found that the quality of earnings 
of Indonesian companies with political connections increased with the effectiveness of 
corporate governance, but declined along with a more stable political environment. The 
results of Harymawan and Nowland's research show that changes in political stability and 
management effectiveness have the opposite effect, when associated with politically 
connected companies. 
This study contributes to the earnings quality literature by providing detailed reviews 
of the concept of earnings quality, reviewing the latest findings, and political connections 
as one of the factors thought to influence the quality of earnings information, and the 
practice in Indonesia.  
 
2. EARNINGS QUALITY 
Definition of Earnings Quality 
In essence, no single conclusion on what earnings quality is, because “quality” is 
contingent on the decision context: given the inherently context-specific nature of earnings 
quality. It is not surprising that earnings quality is not defined or measured in a uniform 
way.The quality of earnings is usually defined in two different perspectives, the decision 
usefulness perspectives and the economic-based perspectives. From a decision-usefulness 
perspective, earnings quality is regarded as being high if the earnings numbers are useful 
for decision making purposes. Based on this point of view, the notion of earnings quality is 
defined differently by different users of financial statements. For example, according to 
Dechow et al. (2004) and Dechow et al. (2010), analysts are likely to view earnings to be of 
high quality when the earnings numbers accurately reflect the company’s current operation 
performance, are good indicators of future operating performance and are a good summary 
measure for assessing firm value. This is consistent with the objectives of financial 
analysts, which are to evaluate the performance of the company, assess the extent to which 
current earnings indicates future performance and determine whether the current stock 
price reflects instrinsic firm value. Investors are likely to have similar objectives. On the 
other hand, creditors and compensation committees may define high quality earnings as 
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earnings that are easily convertible into cash flows and that reflect managers’ real 
performance (Kamarudin & Ismail, 2014). 
Earnings quality is the most important information needed by users, but at the same 
time earnings management activities can seriously damage earnings quality (Lo, 2008; Liu 
et al., 2014; Chen et al., 2015). Earnings management activities can cause capital allocation 
to be incorrect, financial markets become unstable, so earnings management is a topic that 
is always discussed on the research side. 
 
Earnings Quality Measurement 
There are two models of identifying earnings management activities that are 
commonly used by many researchers. The most popular method is to break down total 
accruals into normal and abnormal groups; a model that considers discontinuities in income 
distribution and item specific accounts (Man & Wong, 2013). The first model is 
discretionary accruals. This method is the most widely used method in earnings 
management studies. The advantage of the accrual method is that it can reduce the problem 
of time problems that can reflect management's intentions (Khotari, Leone, and Wasley, 
2005; Dechow and Dichev, 2002; Dechow, Sloan, and Sweeney, 1995; Sloan, 1996). This 
model include determinants of past, present, and future operating cash flow as non 
discretionary. Non discreationary accruals should be negatively correlated with present 
cash flow and postively correlated with future cash flow.  
The second measurement that researchers can use is to use a comparison of asset 
turnover and profit margins. Jansen et al. (2012)concluded that the quality of a company's 
profits increases if the ATO / PM ratio increases.In theory, an increase in profit margins 
should occur due to high asset turnover. If profits increase while asset turnover decreases, it 
indicates that there has been upward earnings management. Conversely, if the decline in 
profits occurs excessively and an increase in asset turnover, it can be concluded that there 
has been a decline in earnings management. 
Political Connections 
Some indications that a company has political connections are: (1) if at least one of 
the majority shareholders, and/or company executives are members of parliament, a 
presidential aide (such as vice president, minister, deputy minister), or (2) have blood 
relationswith politicians or prominent party (Faccio, 2006). 
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Table 1  
Company Connections with Parliamentarians 
 
Source:  From various sources, 2020 
 
Table 1 explain are two ways a company has connections with parliamentarians. 
First, at least one of the top management is a member of parliament. The top management 
is the company's CEO, president, vice president, chairman, or company secretary 
(Claessens et al., 2000; Faccio and Lang, 2002; Faccio, 2006). Second, the company is said 
to have political connections, if at least one of the majority shareholders is a member of 
parliament. The majority shareholders are shareholders who have control over company 
policy, controlling at least 10% of the shareholders' votes. The form of connection that is 









No. Name Business Career Member of Parliament 
1. Aburizal 
Bakrie 
a. Chairman of Bakrie Business 
Group (1992-now) 
b. Managing Director of PT. 
Bakrie Nusantara Corporation 
(1989-1992) 
c. Managing Director of PT. 
Bakrie & Brothers (1988-1992) 
d. Director of PT. Bakrie & 
Brothers (1974-1982) 
e. PT. Bakrieland Development 
f. PT. Energy Mega Persada 
g. PT. Bakrie Sumatra Plantations 
h. PT. Bakrie Telecom 
i. And Others 
• Member of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly—
MPR-RI (1993-1998) 






a. CEO of PT. Citra Putra Realty 
b. CEO of PT. Oso Securities 
c. CEO of PT. Investment 
Management 
d. CEO of PT. Karimun Granit 
e. CEO of PT. Total Orbit 
Prestasi 
f. And others 
Member of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly 
(2014-2019) 
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Table 2 
Company Connections with a Minister or Head of State 
 
No Name Companies Connections with a 





• CEO PT. ASI 
Pudjiastuti Marine 
Product (2004-now) 
• CEO PT. ASI 
Pudjiastuti Aviation 
(2004-now) 
Minister of Maritime 
Affairs and Fisheries 
(2014 – 2019) 
A majority 





CEO PT. Tiran Group 
(until now) 
Minister of 
Agriculture (2014 – 
2019) 
A majority 





• Commissioner of PT 
Smart Tbk 2004,  
• Commissioner of PT. 
Indosat Tbk 2008,   
• The Main 
Commissioner of PT. 
Visi Media Asia Tbk 
(2014-now) 
Minister of Trade 
(2014-2015) 





Main Director of PT. 










Director of Development 














Son of the 
President 
Source: From various sources, 2020 
 
 
Connection of this type occur when a person who was a head of state or prime 
minister was also a top executive or a large shareholder of the company at the same times. 
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Table 3 
Company Connections with Business Career and Political Career 
 
No. Name Business Career Political Career 
1. Aburizal 
Bakrie 
a. Chairman of Bakrie Business 
Group (1992-now) 
b. Managing Director of PT. Bakrie 
Nusantara Corporation (1989-
1992) 
c. Managing Director of PT. Bakrie 
& Brothers (1988-1992) 
d. Director of PT. Bakrie & Brothers 
(1974-1982) 
e. PT. Bakrieland Development 
f. PT. Energy Mega Persada 
g. PT. Bakrie Sumatra Plantations 
h. PT. Bakrie Telecom 
i. And Others 
a. Chairman of Golkar Party 
(2009-2014) 
b. Coordinating Minister for 
People’s Walfare (2005-
2009) 
c. Coordinating Minister for 
the Economy (2004-2005) 
d. Member of the People’s 
Consultative Assembly—
MPR-RI (1993-1998) & 
(1988-1993) 
2.  Chairul 
Tanjung 
Chairman of CT Corp, which 
consists of three sub holding 
companies: 
1. Mega Corp 
2. Trans Corp 
3. CT Global Resources 
Which includes financial services, 
media, retail, lifestyle, 
entertainment,and natural resources 
Coordinating Minister for the 





a. Managing Director of Business 
Group PT. Hadji Kalla (1968-
2001) 
b. President Commissioner of PT. 
Bukaka Main Engineering (1988-
2001) 
c. Managing Director of PT. Bumi 
Sarana Utama (1988-2001) 
d. President Commissioner of PT. 
Bukaka Singtel International 
Organisasi (1995-2001) 
e. Managing Director of PT. Kalla 
Inti Karsa (1993-2001) 
f. Managing Director of PT. Bumi 
Karsa (1969-2001) 
a. Vice President of 
Indonesia (2004-2009) & 
(2014-now) 
b. Coordinating Minister for 
People’s Walfare (2001-
2004) 
c. Minister of industry and 
trade (1999-2000) 





a. CEO of PT. Tidar Kerinci Agung 
b. CEO of PT. Nusantara Energy 
c. CEO of PT. Jaladri Nusantara 
d. And Others. 
a. Chairperson of the Board 
of Trustees of Gerindra 
Party (2008-now) 
b. Chairman of Gerindra 
Party (2014-now) 
Source: From various sources, 2020 
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Political Connections and Earnings Quality 
Recent literature shows that political connections and company performance are 
interrelated, although there are different conclusions on the sign of this relationship. Like 
research conducted by Al-Dhamari and Ismail (2015); Chaney et al. (2011); and Faccio 
(2010) found that companies with political connections and/or executives involved in 
politics caused severe agency problems in the company. Executives tend to shift their main 
objectives to maximize shareholder wealth, and focus more on political activities because 
of the great pressure in politics (Braam et al., 2015; Roe, 2003), which has an impact on the 
low internal control and the deterioration of the accounting reporting system companies 
(Al-Dhamari and Ismail, 2015; Ramanna and Roychowdhury, 2010; Chung et al., 2005; 
Faccio, 2010), and engineering financial statements to cover up the problem (Rodrigues et 
al., 2007; Watt and Zimmerman, 1990). 
The dominant research into the relationship between political connections and 
earnings quality shows a negative relationship. Like Hashmi et al. (2018) who found that 
companies with political connections tended to have low earnings quality, and vice versa. 
Belkaoui (2004), also reported that companies with low earnings quality tended to have 
political connections, which allegedly aimed at avoiding legal and outside intervention. 
Likewise, Ben-Nasr et al. (2015); Fan and Wong (2002) found that government-owned 
companies tended to have low profit credibility and were easily manipulated. 
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The board of directors involved in politics will certainly influence the quality of 
information that will be disclosed to the public. Some studies have found that the 
involvement of the board of directors in politics can cause agency problems, such as 
reducing management efforts to achieve maximum owner welfare, low internal control of 
the company, the occurrence of window dress actions in financial statement disclosures, 
whose conclusions are to lead to reporting of poor quality information. This paper reviews 
forms of political connections that occur, the quality of corporate earnings, both 
conceptually, measurement, and the relationships among them.  
Therefore, this paper contributes to the earnings quality literature, by investigating 
one of the factors causing the low quality of company profits.The limitations of the study 
lie in the lack of Indonesian research that examines the relationship between political 
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connections and earnings quality Future research is related to the connection of political 
connections and earnings quality needs to be further developed. In future there are various 
cases involving companies in government politics, and this condition certainly will also 
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